Mike Gundy, Brian Kelly, and end-of-half caution

In the latest episode of the college football drama “How Coaches Think,” we present a double affirmation of one particular coaching tendency that’s quite common… but doesn’t have to be.

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Saturday witnessed all sorts of coaching missteps. Two particular mistakes were overshadowed — the first one because the coach made a more questionable decision later in the game, the second one because the coach’s team still won its contest.

The first misstep — not an outrageous one, but ultimately a decision whose negative components eclipsed the positive dimensions — came from Brian Kelly at the end of the first half of Notre Dame’s game at Clemson.

The game reset is as follows: Notre Dame faced a fourth and five at the Clemson 44 with 34 seconds left before halftime, trailing 14-3. Conditions were rainy, and although Clemson had 14 points, the Tigers were shut out in the first 14:26 of the second quarter.

Naturally, had Notre Dame gone for the first down and failed, Clemson would have had a chance to get a field goal before halftime. However — and this point will be explained presently — the Tigers would have needed at least 20 yards, probably 25, to get into long field goal range. Given that their offense had struggled and given that a long kick in rainy weather was no likely bet, Notre Dame stood a good chance of being able to keep Clemson off the scoreboard if it surrendered the ball at the Tiger 44 with about 28-30 seconds remaining.

This, in short, is what Kelly — in the majority among his brother coaches — did not value. He valued the safety of giving up the ball via punt, and not allowing points. This, despite being at the opponent’s 44 with very little time left in a half.

Let’s stop for a second and reiterate: This was not an outrageously bad decision. As far as coaching mistakes go, it’s in the middle — near 5 on a scale of 1 to 10. Yet, it is worth discussing because — as is the case with so many coaching decisions — it wasn’t necessarily bad in itself, but because of the contexts in which it was made.

Let’s consider the following: If this was a 24-13 game and not a 14-3 game, and if Deshaun Watson had been throwing the ball quite well, then yes, you wouldn’t want to give the Tigers’ offense the rock near midfield with roughly 30 seconds left. However, this was a defense-first game, so the idea that Clemson’s offense posed a major risk to the Irish at the time just didn’t hold water. (The clouds above Death Valley didn’t hold much water, either — it all came pouring out on Saturday night.)

Second, Notre Dame was trailing by two scores. Wouldn’t the value of a field goal by the Irish before halftime have merited an aggressive fourth-down play? No, I’m not going to say that based on the 24-22 final score, this failure cost the Irish the game. That would be stupid.

The safe and reasonable statement is this: When trailing, every extra bit of scoreboard leverage matters. This was one small but real piece of leverage the Irish and Kelly passed up.

It’s a very simple reality: When coaches face fourth down and more than one or two yards in the middle of the field, especially in the area between the 50 and the opponent’s 38 or 37 in the final half-minute of the first half, they usually opt to punt instead. This is a specific situation in which coaches are very cautious. They give up the ball via punt because they’re so petrified at the thought of giving up the ball on downs, thereby enabling the opposing team to score a field goal before half… even though there’s under half a minute left.

This is one manifestation of something we see a lot from coaches on a larger level: The last minute of a half — sometimes the first, other times the second — brings out very cautious responses which don’t seem to match a team’s best interests.

We saw this in a very different way in the Oklahoma State-Kansas State game from Saturday.

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With the clock ticking inside the 50-second mark of regulation, and with his offense blowing away Kansas State’s tired front seven, Oklahoma State head coach Mike Gundy didn’t need to do anything. With his team trailing by one point (34-33), he just needed to have his offense continue to line up, get five or six yards on a running play, and gain more first downs. The clock was rolling, the Wildcats were spent, and Oklahoma State was in position to kick a go-ahead field goal of under 35 yards. Kansas State had only one timeout left as OSU faced a third and two at the KSU 17. The obvious play for Gundy was to allow KSU to burn that last timeout if Bill Snyder wanted to. The Cowboys just needed to continue to run the ball, gaining yards and making a field goal that much shorter.

Instead, Gundy called a timeout with 47 seconds left. Not only that, Gundy — after the timeout — had his team center the kick by losing three yards.

First of all, centering the ball doesn’t have to occur at the expense of yardage. Second, centering the ball is something Oklahoma State could have done without using a timeout to confer and discuss. These two oversights by the Cowboys made the field goal longer. They also coexisted with a non-attempt to get more yards and a first down on that third-and-two play, which didn’t make sense.

All in all, Gundy’s various moves in that sequence basically enabled Kansas State to get the ball back with 32 seconds left. Had Gundy played his cards properly, KSU and Snyder would have had to call timeout in order to get the ball back with any appreciable amount of time remaining. Moreover, “playing your cards right” should have meant that Oklahoma State went for the first down on third and two, but with the key detail of running the ball in a direction that would have centered the ball for the kick. OSU could have kicked that field goal on the last play of the game, or at least inside the 20-second mark if Snyder called his final timeout a little earlier. Instead, OSU — by calling that timeout early (0:47) — enabled Snyder to use his last timeout with 37 seconds to go, giving the Wildcats half a minute in which to operate.

Oklahoma State’s defense was able to preserve the win, but those moves by Gundy jeopardized his team’s chances of winning.

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We see it from time to time in a number of forms: Coaches get very concerned about making sure everything goes just right in the final minute of a game. They order a ball to be spiked on first down when trailing, even though there’s more than enough time to run the first-down play and/or a series of four scrimmage plays in the time allotted. Coaches will have their offenses hurry up when there’s not much of a need to hurry up. Being overly cautious, overly concerned, is a natural instinct for any of us who follow football. Yet, if you’re practiced enough in the art of end-of-half management, the final minute is a much more expansive canvas than the casual fan ever realizes.

Pay attention to “end-of-half caution” as this season continues.

About Matt Zemek

Editor, @TrojansWire | CFB writer since 2001 |

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