ATLANTA, GA – MARCH 05: The Atlanta United fans cheer during the game against the New York Red Bulls at Bobby Dodd Stadium on March 5, 2017 in Atlanta, Georgia. (Photo by Mike Zarrilli/Getty Images)

Saturday night’s 2-2 draw between Toronto FC and Atlanta United has an argument for most entertaining MLS game so far. It was end-to-end action between two sets of almost unrivaled attacking firepower that were desperate for goals. Every game gets really entertaining when Sebastian Giovinco gets super passionate. But when you add such a potent counter-attacker like Atlanta, you end up with a firecracker of a game.

The biggest story of the game from the viewpoint of Toronto was the sheer volume of chances they created, and the FC Dallas-level failure to convert most of them. They threw serious numbers forward and peppered Atlanta’s backline with Jozy Altidore’s hold-up play and short, low crosses from the wing backs. TFC finished with 20 shots total on the night.

But for Atlanta, it’s the first implementation of MLS’ closest version of total (attacking) football, harking back to the days of Johan Cruyff. Tata Martino put in action a tactical plan that gave the attackers freedom to move where they pleased, disregarding the entire concept of numerical formations. The free-flowing nature of the system extended throughout the lineup, although to a lesser extent.

MLS calls it a 4-2-3-1, the TSN broadcast called it a 4-4-2 diamond, and the official Atlanta twitter account made it out to be some version of a 4-3-3. In reality, it was none of these. All we know is that there was, at least for the first half, two center backs. Other than that, the players went where they wanted.

The effectiveness of it was based around the ability of Julian Gressel to cover a lot of ground, and for at least one of the front three (Miguel Almiron, Hector Villalba, and Yamil Asad) to be taking some defensive responsibility at any given time. Carlos Carmona and Jeff Larentowicz — classified as duel No. 6s, although that’s debatable — were mostly responsible for covering the space in front of the backline and making sure the attackers received the ball in higher positions.

Atlanta didn’t attack a ton. They were on the road against a TFC team that was determined to spend as much time as possible in the final third, a la New York Red Bulls. But when they did, they used a variety of different rotations that would free different players in different parts of the field.

Sometimes, they went direct and went from Almiron in the middle to a splitting through-ball to a forward, like what happened on their first goal:

Other times, they skipped the middleman and went right over top, as occurred on their second goal.

These are the simplest examples. Looking deeper, you see that there were plenty more tactical wrinkles thrown in by Martino, who probably knows a little something about tactical wrinkles.

Full backs Tyrone Mears and Greg Garza were an important element of the system. Martino would allow the full backs to move in centrally and act as something of a secondary creator behind Almiron, which could take width away. But it overloaded central midfield channels and gave opponents a look they rarely see. It reminded me a bit of what Gregg Berhalter did in Columbus with Harrison Afful.

When one of Garza or Mears would invert slightly, it allowed Asad or Villalba or even Gressel to hit the wide channels hard, opening more space centrally for a run from someone like Villalba. Injured striker Josef Martinez loved to hit the gap between the center backs, and his replacements have been similar with their runs. This is in part thanks to the maneuvering of the full backs.

Almiron, technically, started as a winger rather than as a central No. 10, and this is by design. Starting as an outside midfielder allowed him to make runs centrally from the flank, which made his positioning more unpredictable and further confused the marking of backlines. Seattle is similar with Nicolas Lodeiro.

With the Paraguayan moving in and out of the midfield like he did, others like Asad and Villalba were able to fill the space he left, and thus vary the starting points of their runs. It was an incredibly free-flowing system, and the attacking flexibility it provided Atlanta’s talented attackers was fascinating.

There’s another element to this, though. They still had to play defense, and for a lot of teams, it would have been hard to stay compact and organized along backline while also continuing to play a system that relied on constant motion and individual mobility. Martino was able to assuage these concerns with his use of the three deeper-lying midfielders.

Larentowicz was only the second-best red-headed d-mid on the day, and he eventually became a half-center back when Atlanta moved away from the four-in-the-back to…something else…but he and Carmona played well for most of the game protecting the backline, and they were crucial in preventing TFC from roasting too much on poor Leandro Gonzalez Pirez.

Perhaps more important was Gressel, who appears to have the lungs of a marathon runner. He often took defensive positions alongside the two true d-mids to make sure the wide channels remained closed. TFC were unable to move the ball laterally as easily thanks to the rookie Providence product.

Atlanta earned a solid point on the road against a good conference foe, and it was thanks to the debut of their version of total football, 40 years after the original. As long as Miguel Almiron and Hector Villalba are free to go where they please in the attack, matches will continue to be end-to-end thrillers.

About Harrison Hamm

Sports stuff for The Comeback. Often will write about MLS. Follow me on twitter @harrisonhamm21.